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Abstract
The growing number of information security breaches in organisations presents a serious risk
to the confidentiality of personal and commercially sensitive data. Current research studies
indicate that humans are the weakest link in the information security chain and the root cause
of numerous security incidents in organisations. Based on literature gaps, this study
investigates how procedural security countermeasures tend to affect employee security
behaviour. Data for this study was collected in organisations located in the United States and
Ireland. Results suggest that procedural security countermeasures are inclined to promote
security-cautious behaviour in organisations, while their absence tends to lead to noncompliant behaviour.
Keywords: Employee Security Behaviour, Information Security Policy, Security Education,
Information Security Awareness.

1.

Introduction

Traditionally, organisations have prioritised a technological approach in order to protect their
information assets from potential security attacks. While technical tools are essential, research
and practice show that technology is unable to provide an adequate solution when it comes to
certain illicit human actions such as sharing passwords with colleagues, violation of a clear
desk policy, or inappropriate disposal of confidential documents [5]. Compliance with such
rules entirely depends on employees’ motivation to conform, while various sources refer to
humans as the weakest link in the security chain [9]. IBM’s 2015 Cyber Security Intelligence
Index reports that 95% of cyber security breaches are due to human error [20, p.7].
Research and Crossler et al. [9, p. 90] have drawn attention to a notable gap in the
literature which has arisen because much of the focus of extant security research is on
technical issues, “although a predominant weakness in properly securing information assets is
the individual user within an organisation”. Behavioural Information Security (InfoSec)
research focuses on the mitigation of threats to information assets by identifying factors that
promote security cautious behaviour or trigger illicit acts of individuals. These studies
enhance our understanding of employee security behaviour by drawing on perspectives such
as criminology [10], psychology [23], and organisational control [4]. Additionally, IS
researchers have suggested various security countermeasures that can be employed to combat
non-compliant behaviour of employees [11], [21]. Based on the predictions of the general
deterrence theory (GDT), security countermeasures can serve as deterrent mechanisms to
prevent information systems IS misuse [11], [29].
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This paper introduces an extended GDT model, indicating that in addition to their
negative deterrent effect, security countermeasures also have a positive impact upon
employee security behaviour. The results advance our understanding of the underlying
process through which security countermeasures affect employee security actions and
highlight the important role of employee information security awareness in this process. Our
findings also have important implications for the practice of IS security management.

2.

Literature Review

Organisational strategies for reducing IS misuse generally fall into four stages – deterrence,
prevention, detection, and recovery. These four stages are collectively referred as the Security
Action Cycle [30]. Based on this model, effective IS security management should aim to
maximise the number of deterred and prevented incidents of non-compliant behaviour and
minimise those that are detected and punished. Built on Straub and Welke’s [30] framework,
Willison and Warkentin [31] offered Extended Security Action Cycle that adds the insider
abuse intention formation to the original work – the phase that occurs before deterrence. The
focus of this paper is on the stage of deterrence. This phase refers to the use of deterrent
security countermeasures such as information security policies and security education with
the aim to reduce IS misuse. Following Hovav and D’Arcy [19], we use the term “procedural
security countermeasures” to collectively describe these controls.
An information security policy defines rules and guidelines for the proper use of
organisational IS resources. In line with a deterrence perspective, security policies rely on the
same fundamental mechanisms as societal laws, – that is outlining knowledge of what
constitutes illicit behaviour increases the perceived threat of punishment for unacceptable
actions [11]. Security education has a similar deterrent effect through an ongoing security
training. The ultimate purpose of education is to enable users to make good decisions by
reminding them the guidelines regarding an acceptable usage of information systems and the
potential outcomes in the event users circumvent the outlined rules. In the extant literature,
security education is considered to be part of Security Education, Training, and Awareness
(SETA) programmes. While there are many forms of SETA programmes, including security
awareness e-mails and newsletters, and briefings on the consequences of IS misuse, this
research concentrates on security education as it is the most commonly used form of SETA
programmes in organisations [11].
Several IS researchers have empirically assessed the effectiveness of procedural security
countermeasures. The majority of these studies have employed GDT (or some variation of
GDT) as a theoretical foundation, assuming that procedural security countermeasures operate
as deterrent mechanisms by increasing perceptions of some form of penalty for unacceptable
behaviour and hence, reducing IS misuse. Despite the solid theoretical basis, a comprehensive
literature review conducted in the course of this study has demonstrated that the findings of
deterrent-based research are inconclusive. Although some studies provide evidence that
information security policies reduce IS misuse [8], [28], [29], others contradict these
inferences [22]. Similarly, Barlow et al. [2] reported that security education is an important
predictor of security-compliant behaviour, but Lee et al. [22] concluded that security
awareness programmes do not reduce IS misuse. Furthermore, under the presumption that a
simple presence of security policies in organisations has no impact on employee actions,
additional studies reported that user awareness about information security policy [11] and
policy visibility [28] encourage compliance with security policies.
Although these previous studies are highly informative, they investigated the direct effect
of procedural security countermeasures on employee security behaviour, neglecting the
important role of user information security awareness. In particular, a simple presence of the
information security policy may not have a desired effect on employee security behaviour [5].
The purpose of the information security policy, as is security education, is to increase
information security awareness, which, in turn, will promote security-cautious behaviour [2].
However, within the established literature territory, we have not found any empirical studies
confirming that security policies and security education affect security actions in
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organisations indirectly through information security awareness. Additionally, various IS
studies emphasised that information security awareness plays an important role in
encouraging security-cautious behaviour [5], while empirical findings appeared to be
contradictory. For example, although Bulgurcu et al. [5] reported that user general awareness
about information security has a positive effect on their behaviour, Lee et al. [22] asserted that
a degree of awareness has no impact on employee security actions. Moreover, there are calls
in the literature to “identify factors that lead to information security awareness as it would be
an important contribution to academics, since there is a gap in the literature in this direction”
[5, p.543].
Hence, despite the growing body of knowledge in the area of Behavioural InfoSec in
recent years, which offers practical solutions on how to encourage security-cautious
behaviour and prevent non-compliant actions of employees, there are still several avenues of
research that have only barely been explored. In particular, in comparison to other areas of
Behavioural InfoSec research, the impact of security countermeasures on security-related
behaviour has received relatively little attention. Moreover, the empirical findings are
contradictory and therefore, inconclusive. Hence, taking in consideration the aforementioned
literature gaps, the objective of this study is to answer the following research question:
• How do procedural security countermeasures affect security behaviour in
organisational settings?

3.

Theoretical Context

Our proposed theoretical model, shown in Figure 1, integrates procedural security
countermeasures (e.g. security education and an information security policy), information
security awareness, and employee security behaviour. The model expands on GDT by
including procedural security countermeasures as factors that tend to increase employee
information security awareness. In turn, employee awareness about organisational
information security requirements, security threats and consequences of illicit actions is
inclined to lead to compliant behaviour. That is, procedural security countermeasures
influence employee security behaviour indirectly through employee security awareness.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework

3.1.

General Deterrence Theory

The theory of deterrence relies on three individual components: severity, certainty, and
celerity of sanctions. Based on the rational choice view of human behaviour, GDT is based
upon the central proposition that illicit behaviour can be controlled by the threat of sanctions.
Therefore, GDT focuses on disincentives against committing a criminal act and the effect of
these disincentives on deterring others from committing deviant acts [3]. The original theory
assumes that if a punishment is severe, certain and swift, a rationally calculating human being
will measure the gains and losses before engaging in crime and will desist from a criminal act
if the loss is greater than the gain. Therefore, GDT posits that “people respond to policing and
the punishment that is associated with the effective policing” [29, p. 258]
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Classic GDT has been widely employed in the IS security context under presumption that
employees choose to engage in inappropriate behaviour and therefore, organisational
sanctions will prevent deviant actions of employees and deter computer abuse [13]. GDT was
further extended and policing is being associated with security countermeasures, including
information security policies [22], security education [2], and technical controls [10],
assuming that these controls also deter illicit actions of individuals. Therefore, in line with
GDT, researchers assume that organisations can reduce IS misuse by implementing anti-virus
software, using password protection systems, enforcing information security policies, and
fostering employee information security awareness through effective security education
programmes.
3.2.

Employee Security Behaviour

In this research, employee security behaviour is defined as “the behaviour of employees in
using organisational information systems (including hardware, software, and network systems
etc.), and such behaviour may have security implications” [18, p. 243]. Examples of employee
security behaviour include how members of staff handle their passwords, how they deal with
organisational data, and how they use network resources [18]. This behaviour may either pose
or moderate organisational IS security threats.
This study does not focus on any specific type of behaviour but at the same time aims to
distinguish between positive and negative behaviours because factors that influence these
actions may vary. Subsequently, the behaviours of interest include compliant behaviour (i.e.
adhering to the policies, procedures, and norms of an organisation in relation to information
security) and non-compliant behaviour (i.e. intentional but non-malicious behaviours of
employees that may put organisational information systems at risk and entail non-compliance
to the policies, procedures, and norms of an organisation in relation to information security).
3.3.

The Role of Information Security Awareness

Bulgurcu et al. [5, p. 532] define information security awareness as “an employee’s overall
knowledge and understanding of potential information security-related issues and their
ramifications, and what needs to be done in order to deal with security-related issues”.
Security-aware employees are familiar with the security practices and rules of an organisation
as well as their responsibilities regarding organisational information resources and the
consequences of abusing them, including loss of reputation, substantial financial losses, and
even complete disruption of business. When employees understand the purpose of
organisational security requirements, they tend to conform with organisational security rules
[5].
Prior research confirms that public awareness can reduce certain illicit acts like drunk
driving [15], shoplifting [27], and workplace drug use [26]. Furthermore, Bulgurcu et al. [5]
and D’Arcy et al. [11] emphasised the important role of user security awareness in
encouraging compliant behaviour. Procedural security countermeasures are important
organisational artifacts that raise employee awareness regarding potential security threats and
consequences of devious behaviour [11]. In turn, the increased awareness has a positive
impact upon security-related behaviours because employees tend to understand the
importance of following organisational information security rules [5].

4.

Research Approach

The endeavour of our research is to understand social interactions between security
countermeasures and employee behaviour from a perspective of study participants. Rich
qualitative findings within a given context as opposed to broad generalisations are essential
for this purpose and therefore, a qualitative approach was adapted in this study. The
methodology employed in this research draws on the analytical grounded theory approach
[24] and employs the constant comparative method [25].
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Data collection was carried out using semi-structured in-person interviews. In total, 19
individuals were selected for interviews, drawn from organisations across a range of industry
sectors. Nine interviews were conducted in the United States and ten in Ireland. Details about
the interviewees and their organisations are given in Table 1. The interview guide was
constructed following a thorough analysis of the literature. The guide included questions
about procedural security countermeasures, information security awareness and the impact of
these factors on employee security behaviour.
Table 1. Facts about interviewees of US and Irish organisations
Names (aliases)
CloudSerUS
RetCoUS
CivEngCoUS
TechCorpUS
EducInstUS
FinCoUS
PublCoUS
TechCorpIrl
CharOrgIrl
BevCorpIrl
PublOrgIrl
EducOrgIrl
TelCommCorpIrl
ResRegIrl
BankOrgIrl

Column 1
IT; 1998; large
Finance; 1932; large
Civil Engineering; 1945; SME
IT; 1968; large
Education; 1868; large
Finance; 1982; large
Publishing; 2005; SME
IT; 1968; large
Charity; 1883; large
Beverage Manufacturing; 1944; large
Publishing; 2000; SME
Education; 1845; large
IT; 1984; large
Energy Regulation; 1999; SME
Finance; 1982; large

Column 2
1 person: Software Developer
1 person: Security Executive
1 person: Civil Engineer
2 people: Security Researchers
2 people: Administrator & Professor
1 person: Security Consultant
1 person: Business Owner
2 people: Product Manager & IT Executive
1 person: Data Protection Officer
1 person: IT Executive
1 person: Chief Editor
2 people: Administrator & Lecturer
1 person: Software Developer
1 person: Policy Analyst
1 person: Security Executive

Organisations and participants were purposefully selected. In this particular study, it was
important to interview organisations from a broad range of industries in order to capture data
from organisations with various levels of security with the aim to grasp a holistic view of the
research problem. The initial intent was to interview one person in a managerial position and
one regular employee in each organisation in order to understand views of both an
experienced user and someone with little (if any) experience in the area of information
security. Although this proved to be difficult due to the access issues, overall out of nineteen
interviewees, eight had expert knowledge on the topic of information security, six had very
good knowledge, and the remaining five had basic knowledge regarding information security.
The principle of theoretical sampling was employed in order to guide data collection.
Data collection was divided into four stages. In the opening stage (Stage 1), four US
organisations of various sizes and with different levels of security were selected, particularly
RetCoUS, FinCoUS, PublCoUS, and CivEngCoUS. Four interviews, - one in each
organisation, - were conducted. This data was analysed (Phases 1 and 2 of data analysis) in
order to guide further data collection. Phase 1 of data analysis involved the segmentation of
the body of data into discrete ‘incidents’ [15] (Figure 1). In Phase 2, a set of first-round
provisional categories was generated, to which the segmented data would be coded. These
categories took two forms: participant-driven and researcher-driven. Having segmented and
labelled the body of data and generated a set of first-round provisional categories, one-third of
incidents or units were examined and placed into one or more of these categories, and,
analysis of their content gave rise to the formation of additional provisional categories. As the
process unfolded, connections between emerged categories started to arise (Table 2).
Following the emerged associations between the aforementioned concepts, the next step
of data collection (Stage 2) was to interview organisations where procedural security
countermeasures were either present or absent in order to find out how these controls tend to
influence security behaviour. Furthermore, selecting interviewees with different levels of
knowledge in the area of information security was vital to discover the role of information
security awareness. To select suitable organisations, a short questionnaire was conducted over
the telephone with potential participants. Subsequently, five interviews were conducted in
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CloudSerUS, TechCorpUS, and EducInstUS. The body of data was analysed again (Phases 1
and 2 of data analysis, see Figure 1) and provisional results have confirmed the associations
emerged in Stage 1.
Table 2. Results of Phases 1 and 2 in the United States
Emerged Associations
Information Security Policy and Increased Information Security Awareness
Lack of Information Security Policy and Lack of Information Security Awareness
Security Education and Increased Information Security Awareness
Lack of Security Education and Lack of Information Security Awareness
Increased Information Security Awareness and Compliant Behaviour
Lack of Information Security Awareness and Non-compliant Behaviour

Furthermore, the same process was repeated in Ireland. In particular, Stage 3 involved
selecting comparable organisations in terms of the size and level of security, including
BankOrgIrl, CharOrgIrl, ResRegIrl, BevCorpIrl, and PublOrgIrl. Five interviews were
conducted in these organisations (one in each organisation) and subsequently analysed
(Phases 1 and 2 of data analysis). Concepts and associations between these concepts started to
emerge and were similar to the provisional findings discovered in the US organisations
interviewed in Stage 1 of data collection (please refer to Table 2). Therefore, the selection
criteria for Stage 4 was similar to the criteria used to choose organisations in the United States
for Stage 2. Three organisations located in Ireland (TechCorpIrl, TelCommCorpIrl, and
EducOrgIrl) and comparable with the US organisations selected in Stage 2 in terms of the size
and level of security, were chosen for further interviewing. Five more interviews were
conducted in these organisations. The interviews were transcribed and analysed (Phases 1 and
2 of data analysis) and results have confirmed the associations emerged in Stages 1 and 3
(Table 2). It is important to note that the study’s findings are based on the data combined from
both data sets.
The next phase of data analysis (Phase 3 - Coding on) involved merging both data sets
and further breaking down of incidents of data identified in the first phase in order to offer a
more in-depth understanding of the highly qualitative aspects and offer clearer insights into
the meaning embedded therein. In Phase 4, the provisional categories identified in the second
phase were analysed for their characteristics and properties so as to develop a ‘rule for
inclusion’ in the form of a propositional statement, coupled with sample data. As a ‘rule of
inclusion’ was developed for each category, the remaining two thirds of the data segments
were analysed, compared and coded. As the constant comparative procedure progressed, data
incidents that fitted with a ‘rule for inclusion’, validated that category and emerging
theoretical insights. Furthermore, data incidents that failed to fit with existing categories,
generated leads to the formation of additional categories. Over the course of this analytical
process, categories underwent various changes: while some of them were substantiated
quickly, others were eliminated as irrelevant to the focus of inquiry; some were merged due to
overlaps or needed to be redefined, and new categories emerged. Subsequently, data reduction
(Phase 5) was performed in order to emphasise findings relevant to the objectives of this
study. Finally, Phase 6 involved writing analytical memos and validating the proposed
findings by seeking evidence in data. Eisenhardt [14] argued that theoretical saturation is
reached when a researcher is observing phenomena that have been seen before and therefore,
incremental learning becomes minimal. In this study, it was determined that the point of
theoretical saturation has been reached once 19 interviews were conducted.

5.

Research Findings and Discussion

Our findings indicate that procedural security countermeasures tend to increase information
security awareness, which, in turn, has a tendency to encourage compliant behaviour.
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5.1.

Security Education and Information Security Awareness

Study participants from CloudSerUS, TechCorpUS, TechCorpIrl, and CharOrgIrl reveal that
security education tends to increase employee information security awareness. An IT
Executive from TechCorpIrl comments:
“When a new member of staff starts, they have to do a generic training to increase
their understanding [about security], so that they do not compromise the
company...”
In contrast, study participants from organisations such as BankOrgIrl, EducOrgIrl,
TelCommCorpIrl, and CivEngCoUS, share that the lack of security education tends to lead to
the lack of information security awareness. For example, a Security Executive of TechCorpIrl
notes:
“A lot of security issues are associated with human ignorance. I think there is an
aspect of what people do not know. If they do not know, it then causes the gaps and
exposures.”
Overall, our results demonstrate that security education tends to increase employee
information security awareness. The purpose of security training is to educate employees on
how to protect vital organisational assets and why a certain set of rules has to be in place. The
‘why’ is particularly important because if employees underestimate the significance of a
certain rule, they may not be able to justify the extra effort they need to make in order to
follow the rule, and, consequently, violate information security requirements. Additionally,
when employees fail to understand the reason behind security rules, they may give inaccurate
interpretation of their presence and, consequently, misjudge the importance of security
requirements.
Security education appeals to employee conscience by providing details of dreadful
consequences that an organisation may experience in the event of a security breach. Fear
appeals are induced when consequences for the offender are outlined during security
education sessions. Once all these aspects are covered through security education (e.g. how to
protect sensitive information, why there is a need to follow rules, consequences of nonconformity for both the organisation and the offender), employees become information
security conscious and therefore, are inclined to follow rules. Furnell et al. [16] argued that
user information security knowledge is critical to ensure compliance and can be delivered to
end-users through education and training. While studies by Barlow et al. [2], Siponen et al.
[28] and Straub [29] indicated that security education has a direct effect on employee security
actions, it must be noted that information security awareness is an outcome of security
education and therefore, security education tends to lead to compliant behaviour indirectly,
through security awareness.
5.2.

Information Security Policy and Information Security Awareness

Study informants from CloudSerUS, TechCorpIrl, TechCorpUS, and RetCoUS suggest that a
policy is inclined to increase employee security awareness. A Product Manager reveals that
information security is a top priority in TechCorpIrl. There is a detailed information security
policy in place that outlines organisational information security requirements and instructs
employees in terms of appropriate and inappropriate actions. The Product Manager asserts:
“I think [when policy is present], people are very conscious of what is appropriate
and what is not appropriate because the policy dictates what they can do and what
they cannot do...”
Further, a Software Developer from CloudSerUS believes that the information security
policy tends to increase information security awareness and hence, leads to compliant
behaviour. He stresses that when the information security policy is present, employees
understand what “good” and what “bad” behaviour is and act accordingly:
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“When there are no security policies, employees generally do not know what is
right and what is wrong... therefore, employees are probably more susceptible to
doing something that one may not think is wrong. [When policy is present], people
are very conscious of what is appropriate and what is not appropriate because the
policy dictates what they can do and what they cannot do…”
Our findings demonstrate that a security policy tends to increase employee awareness
about information security. Typically, a security policy aims to outline organisational
information security requirements and the rules that derive from these requirements.
Furthermore, security policies provide information on sanctions in the event of non-compliant
behaviour, and rewards to encourage compliant behaviour. Although Chan et al. [7] and
Straub [29] confirmed that the establishment of information security policies in organisations
is vital to encourage security compliant behaviour, these studies do not specify that security
policies affect employee actions indirectly through information security awareness. However,
Lee et al. [22] found that the information security policy has no impact on IS misuse
behaviour. This contradicting finding could be explained by the employees’ lack of awareness
of the security policies existence.
Further analysis revealed that for the security policy to be effective, it must retain certain
characteristics. Bulgurcu et al. [5] asserted that the mere presence of the information security
policy in an organisation does not lead to desirable actions. Employees must be aware of the
document and its content and must understand why certain security measures are in place.
The most common way to inform employees about security policies is through security
education. Data findings of this study are in accordance with these claims. In particular, study
participants from BevCorpIrl, EducOrgIrl, and EducInstUS share that for the policy to have a
desired effect, it must be visible. For example, an IT Manager from BevCorpIrl reveals:
“I have definitely seen rules being broken… just to get stuff done... They do not
understand the implications of why the rule is in place… There are information
security policies but they are hidden away on some website someplace…They are
not in front of people’s faces. People do not see them”.
Furthermore, study participants from CloudSerUS, RetCoUS, and CharOrgIrl assert that
security policies must be up to date. For example, a Security Executive from RetCoUS
suggests that information security policies have to be updated regularly because information
security is constantly evolving, such as threats are changing and therefore, security controls
have to change accordingly:
“We are updating all of our policies because they are outdated. Information security
is always changing, the threats are always changing, the environment is always
changing, and so we have to keep policies up to date”.
As it stands today, cybercrime is a fully commercialised enterprise with functions
identical to legitimate businesses. The fundamental goal of online fraud is to generate profit,
although some cyber attacks have a different purpose. Therefore, cybercriminals continuously
develop new types of malware in order to deceive computer users, steal valuable information,
or pocket funds. As a result, organisational security policies must be updated as regards to
new threats and solutions to defeat these threats.
Next, study informants from BevCorpIrl, RetCoUS, and CloudSerUS expressed that
employee feedback has to be taken in consideration for the information security policy to
function properly. In particular, employees have to apply rules outlined in the information
security policy in practice and if a certain rule is hard or impossible to utilise, employees will
circumvent it. A Security Executive from RetCoUS stresses:
“Having this open dialogue, employees can change the rules by bringing things up.
I have seen it happen in the past. So the policies have been changed based upon the
use of the users and them providing that feedback. RetCoUS wants to make sure
that information security is implemented to augment the business and not prevent
the business from moving forward and so that feedback is really important”.
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Typically, policy makers lack first-hand experience of applying the very same rules they
outline in the policies. In particular, policy implementers take in consideration data protection
laws and organisation’s priorities in terms of the value of information assets, but rarely the
applicability of the rules. Consequently, employees repeatedly hit the wall of overly
bureaucratic rules. Prior research shows that employees circumvent information security rules
if the rules are barrier to productivity [1]. Bulgurcu et al. [5] added that commonly employees
perceive information security rules as inconvenience and obstruction to meet daily work
requirements. Negative attitude towards rules, in turn, discourage information security
compliance [6]. Therefore, employee feedback is vital in developing security policies.
Moreover, interviewees from BevCorpIrl, EducOrgIrl, and EducInstUS point out that
policies must be enforced. In particular, regular audits have to be in place to check if policies
are adhered to. Additionally, employees who break the rules as well as managers on duty
must be held accountable. An IT Executive from BevCorpIrl suggests:
“We have a clean desk policy but it is not adhered at all. It would take a simple
check by a manager in the evenings to enforce it but it is not done… It is important
to have regular, proper security audits, where people and their managers are held
accountable”.
Crime occurs despite the rewards and punishments that have been devised to encourage
compliance. Although crime is a type of behaviour that is condemned by society, human
beings still engage in criminal activities for various reasons. Merriam-Webster dictionary
defines crime as “an activity that is against the law”. Since security policies can be considered
as organisational laws, breaking organisational information security rules is a type of crime.
Because crime is inevitable, organisations must have measures in place to control wrongful
activities of employees. For example, security policies must be enforced through various
mechanisms, including audit checks.
5.3.

Information Security Awareness and Employee Security Behaviour

Study participants from CloudSerUS, CharOrgIrl, TechCorpUS, and EducInstUS share that
employee awareness as regards information security tends to lead to compliant behaviour. In
particular, a Software Developer from CloudSerUS reports the following:
“When [employees] generally know that there is a good reason for not doing
something, they tend to adhere to the information security policy… But if
[employees] do not know, then it is bad...”
On the other hand, study informants from BevCorpIrl, EducOrgIrl, and EducInstUS
report that the lack of information security awareness prompts employees to circumvent
information security rules or exercise poor practices. An IT Executive from BevCorpIrl
shares:
“Information security rules are useful... But I can see why people circumvent them.
Employees are not seeing the implications of why the rule is in place. So they just
see it as a challenge to bypass a system…”
The above statements confirm that employee information security awareness tends to lead
to compliant behaviour. In particular, study participants reveal that when employees
understand that there is a good reason behind a certain rule, they exercise safe practices.
Knowledge about consequences of non-compliant behaviour is vital. On the other hand, when
employees do not understand why a certain rule is in place, they try to bypass it as they
perceive it as a barrier to perform their main duties. Bulgurcu et al. [5] and D’Arcy et al. [11]
confirmed the important role of information security awareness, suggesting that when users
are aware that security policies exist, they are less likely to engage in IS policies misuse. Our
findings are in accord with these studies. Although Lee et al. [22] reported that degree of
security awareness has no impact on employees’ actions, our results show the opposite.
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Conclusion

The extant security research tends to focus on technical issues as opposed to behaviour of
individual users [9]. Our study builds on general deterrence theory to make an empirical
contribution, which takes its place amongst the very few studies in Behavioural InfoSec
research that investigate how procedural security countermeasures affect employee security
behaviour. Further, prior studies that investigate the impact of procedural security
countermeasures on employee security behaviour report contradictory and therefore,
inconclusive results. This research provides empirical evidence that procedural security
countermeasures, including information security policies and security education, tend to lead
to compliant behaviour.
Moreover, prior research that focuses on procedural security countermeasures, tend to
investigate the direct effect of these measures on employee security behaviour. Therefore, the
role of information security awareness has been neglected in the extant literature. While IS
scholars argue that the ultimate purpose of procedural security countermeasures is to increase
information security awareness [2], empirical evidence that supports these claims is lacking.
Also, there are calls in the IS literature for studies that investigate factors that lead to
information security awareness since information security awareness plays the key role in
employees’ compliance behaviour [5]. Finally, IS scholars report contradictory results in
terms of the effect of information security awareness on employee security behaviour (e.g.
Bulgurcu et al. [5] vs. Lee et al. [22]). The findings of this research project fill the
aforementioned gaps and demonstrate that procedural security countermeasures tend to lead
to compliant behaviour indirectly, through information security awareness. These insights
extend general deterrence theory in a novel way. In particular, the deterrent effect of
procedural security countermeasures tends to increase information security awareness. This
awareness, in turn, tends to deter malicious actions of employees and encourage securitycautious behaviour. Furthermore, general deterrence theory is typically used to study negative
behaviours, while there are calls in the literature to apply the theory across the variety of
behaviours, including negative and positive [12]. The focus of this study is both negative and
positive behaviours, which further extends general deterrence theory.
Our findings confirm that a simple presence of security policies in organisations may not
have a desired effect. For an information security policy to be effective, it must retain certain
characteristics. In particular security policies must be up to date and visible. The most
common way to introduce employees to security policies is through security education.
Additionally, policies must be enforced, such as employees have to be checked if they follow
the rules and held accountable if not. Furthermore, managers on duty have to be held
accountable if rules are not adhered to. Finally, employee feedback is important when
designing and implementing information security policies. Since employees have the practical
experience of applying information security rule (as opposed to policy analysts), they are
aware which rules are realistic to use and which are not. If a certain rule prevents employees
from completing other tasks, they may try to circumvent it.
An additional and important contribution of this study is in its methodology. While
studies in the Behavioural InfoSec field make a valuable contribution to the pool of
Behavioural InfoSec research, quantitative methodologies prevail in this research stream.
Crossler et al. [9], however, brought attention to the methodological challenges of quantitative
methods and called for more studies that employ alternative methods, including qualitative.
Moreover, Straub [29] pointed out that “qualitative studies would enhance our [quantitative]
perspective.” In particular, in our study we had a personal contact with interviewees, which
allowed to probe and hence, grasp a deeper understanding of the central phenomenon of this
study, that is security behaviour in organisations, as well as factors that tend to affect
employee actions.
Our results also make an important practical contribution. First, this study highlights the
important role of procedural security countermeasures in managing illicit actions in
organisations. Security practitioners must realise that focusing on technical measures alone
puts organisations at higher risk of security breaches occurring due to “human error”. Second,
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since information security awareness is the key factor in encouraging compliant behaviour, IS
security managers must design security education and policies with the aim to increase
awareness about security threats and consequences of information security breaches. In
particular, real life incidents should be part of security education. Employee awareness that a
security breach may lead to organisation’s bankruptcy and complete shutdown and
consequently, their job loss, would be a strong drive to comply with organisational
information security requirements. Third, security practitioners must take in consideration the
important characteristics a security policy must retain to properly function and fulfil its
purpose.
In terms of study limitations, qualitative data is prone to subjective interpretations.
Although various techniques were employed to avoid research bias (e.g. member checks, peer
debriefing), there is still a possibility that data interpretations had some element of
subjectivity. One of the main concerns with qualitative studies is the generalisability of
research findings. As this study is exploratory in nature, it is not attempting to generalise the
findings but rather to present the uniqueness within study’s context. Furthermore, our research
would benefit from a secondary data source. However, the access to organisational documents
was not possible as it is often the case with studies that investigate sensitive issues.
Nevertheless, our study provides some interesting insights on how procedural security
countermeasures tend to affect employee security behaviour in organisational settings and
answer the research question.
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